The public impact of John Kerry’s three-day visit for the fourth India-US strategic dialogue was somewhat limited as the Uttarakhand tragedy gobbled up emotional as well as media space in India. Although all the right buttons were pressed to take up the key formal points on the bilateral agenda, the dialogue apparently failed to ignite passion as regards the strategic aspect of the relationship between the two countries and push it up from its so-called plateau into the heights.

The result is that the much-sought after ‘big idea’ to take ties to the next level remains elusive. What the dialogue has done, though, is to substantiate that there is no magic wand that can be waved to make differences disappear. Certainly, it takes more than high-sounding rhetoric about the Indo-US relationship as “one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century” or the “common DNA” that Secretary of State John Kerry said the two countries share.

A schedule for further engagement, however, has been put in place with the announcement of US Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to India later this month and the prime minister’s visit to the US in September-October this year. Joe Biden’s scheduled visit is a strong signal of the Obama administration’s desire for political engagement and may help keep up the momentum of high-level interactions and political comprehension of mutual concerns, besides facilitating the operational elements of the relationship.

Ensuring that New Delhi acts in accordance with its promise on the Indo-US nuclear deal, which was to be the cornerstone of the newfound “strategic dialogue” between the two countries, will also be on top of Biden’s agenda. The deal has floundered on the issue of the Indian liability law which the US nuclear power companies have complained had slammed the door on their chances. India’s hesitance in going for the next round of economic reforms has also made it a less attractive proposition for US investors and businessmen.

Kerry has already set a timeframe for the nuclear deal by underscoring the Indo-US joint commitment to its “timely” implementation. The September target for finalising the commercial agreement between the nuclear power companies is sensible, timed as it is to precede or correspond with the visit of Manmohan Singh to the US for the UN General Assembly. Speeding it up is desirable for both sides, but not at the cost of Indian interests.

India has so far allowed the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited to drag out the negotiations with all suppliers, including the US, France and Russia, partly over the issue of confidentiality, but mainly because of India’s nuclear liability law. Kerry could have been happy with the new commitment from New Delhi that it would clear the way by September this year for Westinghouse to set up a power plant in Gujarat.

The September timeline, broadly agreed upon for US nuclear reactor companies to begin setting up shop in India, is a positive step which was long overdue. It is time for Delhi to reclaim this process and lend it the political leadership it requires in its concluding stages. India owes that not only to its friends, who helped end its nuclear isolation five years ago, but also to itself in order to design and utilise a varied energy basket.

Some of Kerry’s discussions were devoted to India’s concern about America’s current preoccupation with the preparation for its 2014 exit from Afghanistan. He sought to reassure New Delhi by trying to undo the impressions that Washington was playing footsie with Islamabad and the Taliban, and in the process disadvantaging both India and Afghanistan.

Some part of the joint statement on the strategic dialogue got locked down due to this factor. Good sense prevailed in the end, and the US reiterated its “red lines” on dealing with the Taliban - breaking with Al Qaeda, renouncing violence, and respecting the Afghan constitution, including the rights of women and minorities. This, in a sense, helped save the Kerry mission. But the recent Kabul attack shows the hollowness of the US reiteration. Under the circumstances, looking for the US to safeguard Indian interests in Afghanistan would be more optimistic than prudent.

India has long supported the US military presence in Afghanistan. The original goal of America in forcing out the extremist Taliban regime in Kabul in 2001 was to transform Afghanistan into a democracy on a more enduring basis which could be possible only through President Karzai and his constitutional democracy being sustained for long with international support.

The perception is that the Obama administration is only too eager to cut and run by striking a deal with the Taliban, upsetting Afghanistan’s ethnic-political balance, with adverse consequences for India’s security. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid has publicly played down New Delhi’s concerns and called the American dialogue with the Taliban an “experiment,” suggesting that the effort must be judged by the “outcomes” rather than the construction of a “process.”

But the silence of the joint statement on what is happening after the dogged efforts of the US to bring the Taliban to the table is one indication that India is not as optimistic about talks with the outfit as the US. The Taliban are part of the Afghan landscape but their vision of the country’s future is flawed for it is exclusionary, not inclusive of Afghanistan’s diversities. Indian diplomacy, while remaining realistic and flexible, must not be oblivious of this basic aspect.

The coming weeks and months will see more confusion as the major actors in Afghanistan, jockey for position. Instead of protesting at what others are doing, India should adopt a more assertive policy on Afghanistan and make it clear to the US regime that no solution that dilutes Delhi’s role in the region would be acceptable to India.

Making the strategic partnership work is vital for both Delhi and Washington in a changing global arena.