In a speech earlier this month at the Asia Society in New York City, Jake Sullivan, the senior policy adviser to presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, sketched the outlines of Clinton’s proposed policy on North Korea.
Sullivan said North Korea would be “right at the top of the agenda” for a Clinton administration, and that Clinton would “drastically” increase pressure on Kim Jong-Un with the goal of securing a deal to limit the isolated country’s nuclear programme.
It is admirable that Clinton’s foreign policy advisers appreciate the magnitude of the threat presented by North Korea and are willing to explore new, creative approaches to a national security problem that has vexed successive US presidents since the 1980s.
Making North Korea a top foreign policy priority would be a welcome change from President Barack Obama’s policy of “strategic patience”. North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme poses a significant threat to regional and global security.
The policy of strategic patience, premised on the hope that the North Korea problem will disappear if the US waits it out, has been roundly criticised.
Sullivan’s statement indicates that Clinton, if elected president, would take a more activist approach to the issue.
Such an approach is desirable, but it remains unclear what such an approach would entail.
A military attack on North Korean nuclear facilities is not a viable option.
Some commentators favour a negotiated agreement in which North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for economic and security benefits.
However, prior experience suggests North Korea will not agree to relinquish its nuclear weapons or would violate any such commitment it might make.
Thus, complete denuclearisation is not a plausible option as long as Kim remains in power.
Therefore, any realistic policy must begin with the premise that North Korea will continue to be a nuclear weapons state in the near term.
Fortunately, Sullivan’s statement appears to be consistent with this hard-nosed, realist viewpoint.
Even so, Sullivan’s words raise at least two questions: How doses the US increase pressure on North Korea? And to what end?
Reading between the lines, Sullivan’s answer is apparently to persuade China, which has more leverage in dealing with North Korea than any other country, to increase pressure on Kim.
The goal would presumably be to persuade Kim to accept verifiable limits on his nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capabilities.
This approach generally makes sense. However, several questions remain unanswered.
l How can the United States persuade China to apply sufficient pressure on North Korea to compel Kim to accept meaningful restrictions on his nuclear weapons programme?
lWhat set of restrictions, short of complete denuclearisation, would be acceptable to both the United States and North Korea?
l Could a Clinton administration persuade Congress and the American public that a less-than-ideal agreement is better than no agreement at all?
In light of the preceding analysis, Clinton’s foreign policy team would be well-advised to consider alternative approaches.
In the final analysis, there are, however, no easy answers to the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.
Even so, Sullivan’s statement offers grounds for optimism that, under Hillary Clinton’s leadership, the United States might achieve greater success in addressing the North Korean nuclear threat than they have under President Obama or President George W Bush.

- David Sloss is a professor of law at Santa Clara University. He worked for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1980s and 1990s, helping draft and negotiate three maj4or East-West arms control treaties. Readers may write him at Law School Faculty, 500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA 95053.